132: What is happening now in Gaza? With Dr. Shira Efron

A

Foreign. Welcome to a new episode of Ask Khalif. Anything. Today we're going to get back to a topic we haven't spoken about in a while, at least not too much in depth, which is Gaza. What's happening on the ground in Gaza? Where does the American Arab peace and rebuilding plan, the Board of Peace, whatever, whatever this system is that is being formed, that is being built out, where does it stand? We're hearing that Hamas is rearming quite dramatically. That's something released from the idf, and that the IDF line, the yellow line, so called, is slowly advancing in Gaza. There's talk in Israel about going back to war, not just in the government, but in opposition, among opposition leaders who are vying to be the next government, because Hamas is not just not disarming, but apparently strengthening. We're also hearing that humanitarian aid distribution is continuing to expand or stabilize. The situation is getting better, possibly for ordinary people on the ground in Gaza living with all this uncertainty, living in large tent encampments. Where does all of that stand? Is that correct? How do we measure these things? Dr. Shira Efron is with us to answer these questions. She's the Distinguished Chair for Israel Policy and Senior Fellow at rand. A leading Middle east expert, especially an Expert on Gaza, Dr. Efron has two decades of experience in policy analysis. In research, she has advised the Israeli Ministry of Defense. She is trusted by Israeli leaders as well as American officials. She briefs leaders in Washington, Jerusalem, European capitals, Arab capitals. Especially relevant to our conversation, she has advised Nikolai Mladinov, who is now the Board of Peace high representative to Gaza. He's the former UN Special envoy to the Middle east dealing with the Israeli Palestinian file, former defense Minister of Bulgaria, and somebody who is trusted by both Palestinians and Israelis. So Shir has been at these decision points. She publishes frequently in the New York Times and Foreign Affairs. She has a doctorate and a master's degree in Public analysis from the RAND School of Public Policy. Very glad she's here. We're going to crack open what is very confusing coverage, maybe even a little bit of a black box, and try and really get a sense of what's actually happening on the ground. Before we do that, I want to tell you that this episode is sponsored by D.D. whitman and dedicated to Dr. Gary B. Whitman, her late husband and father of their three adult children. In Dede's to my children, who all chose their respective spouses both wisely and lovingly, who not accidentally are all Jewish, our purpose in this life is to be who we are and to leave this Earth a little better than we entered it just by marrying fellow Jews, bringing up Jewish children and being proud of who we are is a win not only for our family, but for our religion. Gary and I are lucky parents and grandparents. Thank you, Deedee so much for that dedication, that beautiful dedication. I'd also love to invite everybody to join our Patreon subscribe to our substack. If you're interested in asking the questions that guide the topics we choose to talk about, you can do that at the substack or in our Patreon community. You also get to take part in monthly live streams where I answer your questions live. Join us at www.patreon.com askhavivenything or havivgur.substack.com those links are in the show Notes Shira, how are you?

B

I'm okay. This beautiful dedication moved me in a mall. So before we come into the depressing, I think what's not going to be a very uplifting conversation about Gaza, sadly, I got to tell you, I'm very happy to be here. So many of my friends and family are great fans, have been wanting to come on this podcast for a long, long, long time. So really happy to be here.

A

So glad you're here. Let me get started. Honestly, just what's happening. We heard that Gaza was going to be governed by this Board of Peace. Now we're hearing that they're having workshops in Cyprus to get everything back on track. That's how I find out that for six months it hasn't been on track. They're saying they're on schedule, but there's this technocratic government that's not going to because they can't get Hamas to disarm. What's going on with the effort to build that new Gaza that the Trump plan envisions? And also what's happening on the ground in Gaza.

B

Okay, so let me just start, just for listeners who may not be even as well versed in the details as you are, if that's okay. Because you know what, in eight months in Israel and the Middle east is sort of a century elsewhere, right? So people may not remember that In October of 2025, President Trump basically announced his 20 point plan, right? The Comprehensive Plan for Peace in Gaza. Israel and Hamas agreed to this plan and this brought home the remaining hostages, right? And it also ended, it was brought to a cessation of violence. And the plan was divided into two phases. Phase one of the plan, which is what the parties agreed on, right? Return of the hostages, release of the Palestinian terrorist prisoners that we had no choice but to release as part of this deal. Withdrawal of the IDF to what has become a yellow line. Back then it was around 53% of Gaza was in Israeli hands. Any humanitarian protocol that was agreed on that I can tell you it was a copy paste from the previous ceasefires and that was phase one and it was implemented by both sides. Implemented. Then the cmcc, the Civil Military Coordination center was officially announced in Kiryat Ghat. We heard that the US is taking over from Israel managing of Gaza. Well I'm reminding all these things because they have not really happened the way they were described in the news and I don't think that's necessarily a negative. On January mid January 2026 this year the Trump administration publicly announced that we're moving into phase two. This fragile ceasefire we have, we're cementing it and we're turning into something that's going to be more durable for the stabilization of Gaza and reconstruction of Gaza. And this part was supposed to include all the thorny issues that were pushed to the back burner and actually Hamas and Israel never agreed to the linchpin is Hamas disarmament. But I gotta tell you in this 20 point plan, I'm not going to read it all people can find it but there are things that are uncomfortable also from an Israeli position position its complete withdrawal from Gaza. It's a peace process. It's return of a reform Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. And despite the President's announcement and the launch of the Board of Peace that came around a month later. I don't know if people remember there's a big event in Washington, very exciting. The formerly United States Institute of Peace with pledges and pledges for Gaza's along. There's a long history of pledges for Gaza. This is going to be. We're starting a new era. I'm fast forwarding because we've had since then a war in Iran, a war in Lebanon, a peace agreement with Lebanon. A few things have happened since then but the fact is that the idea was and I think this was the flawed assumption that Hamas would disarm like you said. Da. Why would they? But that's one thing.

A

Sorry to interrupt. It's just it's hard to imagine what did the Trump administration think Hamas would disarm? I thought that that was built in as I think it's Article 2 so that the Israelis wouldn't have to quickly leave Gaza reach that so that the war in Hamas could. This was a Trump covering for Israel, I assumed. Because the alternative is to assume the Americans think Hamas could ever possibly disarm, ever.

B

So here I want to say something generally about the plan and where we are now. But things have evolved. I think that it wasn't just a Trump administration assumption, that was a flawed assumption on Hamas disarming. And I don't know if it was a cover for Israel. I certainly hope not. I have to tell you, the plan is a great plan. It's a plan that all thinkings in Washington, ones that endorse the Trump administration, non political. And I work at the RAND Corporation. We are non. It's not bipartisan, we're nonpartisan. Right. Like the plan is a very, very good plan. And this idea of disarming armed resistance movements, whether Islamic or not, we have precedents in history where it happened. You have to have certain conditions. You have to provide these organizations with motivations to try. I don't argue the motivations are there now. It has to be accepted by the other warring party of some sort of reintegration.

A

Can you give examples?

B

So something called DDR, disarmament, decommissioning reintegration. There's a whole literature about it. We can talk the most successful models, the IRA obviously, in talking about Northern Ireland, England, by the way, took them seven years to disarm. And you had a proper government, you had an agreement. You have the KLA in Kosovo, you had the Taliban, didn't work so well. There's a whole spectrum. But I don't think, let me say, let me rephrase. It's not the most likely outcome that Hamas would disarm, but it's not like unthinkable because if you, and I'm not saying Israel should do this, but under certain conditions, if Hamas says, okay, we can tell ourselves a story, it's all about story you're telling yourself, right? If we can tell ourselves our story that in our disarming we're serving the Palestinian people and this is a retreat. We're moving from, you know, the armed battle now for a thousand years, whatever, I'll take whatever they give me, right. Thousand years and we're doing it with struggle. This could work. If they say we are going to change our, we're going to get some sort of role in the new Palestinian entity. If we can tell ourselves we're doing this for a Palestinian state and this is agreed by the other Palestinian factions, by the way, everything. I'm not making this up. This is what Hamas is saying in the negotiations. They require motivation to disarm and change their identity. It's an Islamic resistance terrorist movement to ask Hamas to lay down their arms. They need to turn into something else for turning into something else. They need motivations. If you ask me if there's some sort of a Zopa or the Venn diagram where Israel can provide agree to the motivations that you know, if Israel is motivated enough to provide Hamas with the conditions they required. At the moment, no, but I don't think that anyone was cynical in putting this line in. I think this is the hope.

A

Okay, so where do things stand? I'm sorry, I interrupted you.

B

No, no, it's okay. So we had beautiful pledges in Washington, a great event. Pledges of $17 billion by different countries in ISF. It's an international stabilization force that would come and everything was supposed to. Right, Things were supposed to. Hamas was to disarm and reconstruction to begin. And I'll just put in another, another point in that you mentioned point two in the plan, but point 17 was there exactly to hedge for the situation that if Hamas delays their consent or refuses to disarm, reconstruction will start in the area that's not under Hamas's control, which is the vast majority of Gaza. We are nine months in from the declaration of the 20 point plan that had a framework of two years that can be extended, but it's a two year plan. So time is rushing. I would have hoped that given that Hamas is not there and Hamas, I mean, I hope on this, in this conversation we don't have to go into description of how evil cynical Hamas is and their idea of what they want to do to Jews and Israelis and how they keep their population hostage. But with the expectation put. The drafters of this plan were smart enough to put in a clause that says, well, if they don't do what we hope they would do, but is unlikely because of what I said before, we have a plan, we move forward. I would have expected that we would move the plan a little bit ahead in the area that's even not under Hamas's control or what you had mentioned. Also there's a technocratic committee that's supposed to be the transitional government for Gaza that was appointed. I would have hope that they would be still. They would be in Gaza taking over some parts of the governance system. But meanwhile they are in Cairo. The yellow line has moved creeping toward what was the Hamas control zone. According to Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister, Israel has now effective control over 70%. Or maybe it was Southern Command, but he and Netanyahu Said we will have 70% of Gaza strips. We are in a deadlock because we have Israel that is preparing for the next war, right? According to everything we hear, we have Hamas that according to Israeli sources, is also preparing for the next war. And again, it's not a surprise. Why wouldn't they? We have Israel controlling the vast majority of Gaza, but with no people. Hamas controls a small area of Gaza, but it has the 99.9% of the people, the technocratic administration for Gaza, this group of Palestinians, they're supposed to govern there in Cairo because rightly so, the Board of Peace says, well, if we put them in Gaza now, Hamas gets the Hezbollah model, right? You have a governance that takes care of the civilian needs of the population. And Hamas can just do what it likes doing anyway, which is rearming and preparing for war. And we have Israel that is heading to elections and that doesn't want to move the plan forward at the moment. Because for the Israeli domestic base, having any progress in Gaza without Hamas, surrender is not appealing before you go to the ballots. So as you mentioned, Board of Peace plus affiliated groups, Tony Blair and others have just met in Cyprus to revamp the process, and I hope they will. There is a lot that can be done and I think the plan is still valid. But it's going to take a big effort on the part of the Trump administration and their partners to bring Israel and Hamas and the mediators and all partners into the corrales to move this forward.

A

So let's go through it systematically. What is Hamas's position? There were leaks from the IDF that they are arming tremendously, I mean, missiles and rebuilding their force structure, recruiting young men back into the fighting forces, training them. Are they coming back? Is the IDF releasing that information? Because the IDF needs to explain that there might be an Israeli military operation coming up. What is Hamas's situation? Do you think we're going back to war? The election timeline is fascinating. Netanyahu will avoid a battle where I don't know what. There could be a bad battle. There could be soldiers killed right before an election where he has been promising for four years or since October 7th, he's been promising total victory when it's a Khon Muhlad, absolute victory, Right? So probably not before October, but after the October election, you think we are going back to war. So two questions. Where does Hamas stand and how do you rate our chances of going back to war in Gaza?

B

So I gotta say that the numbers on Hamas filling the lines, right, Hamas started with sort of like between 20,000 or 30,000 militants in their armed wing. We've been seeing these numbers. Terrorists, you can replenish them. So we've been seeing these numbers for many, many, many months, if not over a year now. Hamas was able to recruit new. Enlist new recruits, just offering them during even the intense fighting, just a bottle of water and some food. Right. It wasn't even money at the time. And think about it, a lot of young people, a lot of young boys on the streets, those are not the sophisticated fighters that they had before, but they're, you know, fighter enough terrorists. So on the numbers, personally, I'm just not that impressed because this is what we've seen and it's not new information. If Hamas is rearming, I would assume so. I don't, there's no, I don't know of any recording of actual smuggling of arms going into Gaza and materials that can be used to produce arms. But there is so much of our stuff in Gaza, right? All the munitions we dropped in Gaza, they, of course they can rearm.

A

They're based on IEDs and.

B

Yeah, IEDs. And I mean, there's just so much stuff in Gaza. So in that regard, I don't, I don't think. I'm not surprised they are preparing for a renewed fight. I also think that Southern Command specifically is eager to go back to fighting

A

fighters, but the next stage of fighting is civilians. I mean, you're moving into a civilian, the most concentrated civilian area, the densely populated civilian area yet of the war that 30% or 40% or whatever it is of Gaza. Southern Command wants to have the IDF move into 40% of Gaza, where 2 million people are, plus Hamas, which. Why wouldn't they just, right, booby trap everything like they did in entire towns over the last three years as the Israeli army moved in. Southern Command is eager to go back to that kind of fighting.

B

I mean, the short answer is yes. South in Command is eager to go back to fighting. They have a good reason. Hamas is still there. Hamas is controlling the population. There was a protest over the weekend against Hamas. We haven't seen big numbers at all. And I don't think it's because the population likes Hamas. I think people are scared. Right. Hamas has shown enough who is the de facto govern and security enforcer in this region. So Southern Command has the justification Hamas is still there. I think it's. There's an issue of can Israel really go back to intense fighting now in Gaza and also before the elections, if it's beneficial or not. But it's definitely within the realm of possibilities. But Hamas is the de facto govern of the part where they control. And I think part of the responsibility lies with the Israeli system that refused to discuss any day after option and prepare it for when we have a military achievement and when Hamas was at its weakest point. When President Trump announced the ceasefire in October 2025, Hamas was not done, but it was its weakest point. It agreed to release all the soldiers, all the hostages, excuse me, all the hostages, including this deceased one. Remember, we all never believed this would happen. You had the mediators, Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, countries that normally are not exactly on the same page on many things. There were barely any fault lines in terms of their approach. You had momentum. If back then, I don't know, it's easier to say in hindsight, but if back then we had the technocratic committee ready, we had something ready to go in, we had everything, prayer, new capacity building, maybe we would be able to pull away from Hamas a little bit. But there's no vacuum, right?

A

Can I lay out for you my frustration of the last three years, which listeners to this podcast will have heard, you know, a dozen times? How standing armies fight guerrilla forces embedded in support of civilian populations. This is a classic problem of war. Somebody once quipped that nobody since Alexander the Great has ever managed to defeat a guerrilla force operating in a supported civilian population. The story of the Jewish revolt against Rome and its astonishing success before the Romans crushed took all the might of the Roman Empire and legions moving across the empire to actually crush it, was that it was a guerrilla force operating from within a supported civilian population. It's the story of Vietnam, Algeria, etc. This is actually not true. It's not correct that you cannot defeat these guerrilla forces in supporting supportive civilian populations, but you have to separate the civilian populations from the guerrillas. And so you have examples, for example, in the Greek civil war with the communists in the north. You have, for example, the Shining Path in Peru. You have the FARC in Colombia, where standing armies did defeat guerrillas operating in support of civilian population. But how did they do it? They solved the problems of the civilians. The civilian guerrilla connection was detached by, you know, coming in with massive amounts of aid and development and promises and protection for those civilians. And then you detach them, and then the guerrillas were isolated, and then you crushed and destroyed those guerrillas. So we actually have two different ways of fighting this kind of enemy. One succeeded and one way never succeeded. And so the fact that the Israelis over the course of the last three years have never given ordinary Gazans a Vision, which is to say Hamas promises you endless, never ending death and sacrifice for their religious vision. We will destroy Hamas. It might be denazification because that's what it took to get Nazism out of Germany, but the day after is the new Germany, the new Gaza. We promise, instead of Smotrich and Benvir promising them total ethnic cleansing. And Bibi staying quiet for three years on this question. And Israel Katz occasionally sort of hinting that maybe he's on the Smotridge side of this instead of being fucking idiots, excuse my French. I'll probably have to edit that out. Why not give. Create that bifurcation, those two paths. And then there might be. We saw so many beginnings of protests and Hamas, we saw them crush the protests of Gazans brutally and violently. The fact that Hamas has to crush these protests violently to me says that some of the resistance to Hamas in Gaza is real. Why can't we double down on it? What is wrong with this government? What is wrong with, with this strategy? Now, I apologize for asking it in this way because you have to work with everybody. So feel free to be slightly more diplomatic than I'm being. Why can't we do the only thing that has ever worked when you have guerrillas embedded in civilian populations? And I feel like I got very excited about this because I need therapy on this issue more than I need explanation. But I would really like to understand why didn't we. And do you think that this is an accurate sort of summary of what's going on and is there a way forward where we do finally separate Hamas from the Gazan population?

B

Yeah. No. Thank you for that because I think you're so correct on so many elements of what you said. And before I go to the fighting part of it, you know, there was criticism maybe about the way Israel fought Hamas, but I think the main issues with this, sort of like the pictures of children from Gaza and the famine campaign, whether it was true or not, but it was about how we treated the civilians. And so I think we missed the civilian component of this and how strategic it was. And it's strategic not for international legitimacy, but also for what you say at the end of the day. I think the Israeli approach revalidates the way of fighting that you mentioned that works the coin, the counterinsurgency, the hearts and minds. Right. The way you're supposed to do this. But Israelis, and it wasn't just the politicians you mentioned, right? This was the atmosphere in the public. There are no innocent people in Gaza. They're all Hamas. And therefore I don't come to the public with complaints.

A

They saw the braying crowds brutalizing the bodies of dead Israelis. 90% of Israelis think the Palestinians will murder every last one of them if they ever have the chance. The public is allowed to feel what it feels. But the political class. Malasot, as we say in Hebrew, what are you going to do? This is the harsh reality. Actually has to win this thing and actually has to be wise and wisdom and winning means you it anyway. It doesn't matter what the public. You have to. The public might have wanted to annihilate every German. Okay. Or every Japanese. After Pearl harbor, we saw people talking that way in America, including the generals in the Pacific, talking about every last Japanese person being killed. And there were. There are polls of US forces in the Pacific, of the soldiers saying every Japanese person should die. But America rebuilt Japan under Douglas MacArthur. And that's wisdom. And so why can't we have a Douglas MacArthur? Why does everything have to be as dumb as humanly possible? I'm not going to ask this again. I'm sorry. And I'm not going to interrupt you again. I apologize. This is like huge. Is the question. This is how we're losing.

B

This is the question and the role of leadership. Right? If you just give the people what they want or you lead and they follow. Right? This whole obsession here with polls. The Israelis are not ready. The public is not ready. I can give you many examples we're showing. The Israeli public opinion is fickle when you tell them a different story and hope. And therefore. And it went before Oslo and before Begin went, you know, signed a peace agreement with Egypt. And there are other agreements as. So I just don't buy this. The Israelis don't want peace. I know that with the Israeli society had an opportunity to go for peace and make concessions for it. They always said yes, but the leadership here is. They have it reversed, right? In a reverse way. And the points you mentioned, even the FARC is one of those successful examples that after successful fighting the farc, there was a decommissioning process. Was it the best? Was it recidivism? You know, we can argue and there's a lot of, like, academic literature on these things. It depends on how nerdy you want to go. But this also helps you achieve the goal of weakening the most. The terrorists, the armed militias. So I think what is happening here is that you have a story of the public. You have a political rank that you. I want to go into politics. But you criticize them enough. You know, I was Called on to help, to help on the civilian dimensions of Gaza. I was called to reserve duty in Kogak and I've done over 400 days or so, sort of. I'm still doing reserves, not working on these issues. That's why I can talk about it now. But I think that also the professional rank was supposed to challenge and say, well, okay, politicians, we understand what you want, but this is the right way to do things. And if there's one thing we should have learned from the blind spot we had that got us to October 7th, right? It's our failure is that we can't just all be in the same mindset. And the group thing, we have to challenge. But the opposite happened. And no one said what you said now, or maybe if they said it, said it very quietly. So where we are now is we are in a situation where we have not done the right thing. I still think that the Trump plan, the 20 point plan, there's no substitute. Going back to war is not going to achieve what we want. Occupying Gaza in perpetuity, as an Israeli Zionist, I just don't think is the right way. And I also don't think we're going to grow the next generation of Zionists in Gaza if we keep people living in displaced camps under piles of trash with rats roaming over. Right? Like this is not the recipe to get it. There is a story to be told for those Gazans. And I don't believe every Gazan is a Hamas terrorist. I don't. And especially the children. Children are children, no matter what, Right? Even if they're born to a really shitty family. You have 2 million people in Gaza. You have 3 million people in the West Bank. I'm not talking about Israeli citizens of Palestinian descent who live in Israel and East Jerusalem. Okay? And they're not going anywhere. No one is taking them. So if we want to tell that story that you think needs to be told, we have to stop turning a blind eye to the idea that there is. There are Palestinian people, whether like it or not, and they're in Gaza and in the west bank. And they don't have to have a terrorist leadership. They don't have to. But we need to enable something else. And I don't think we have enabled it in the most serious, candid way that we should.

A

If the war against Hamas is unwinnable without that civilian dimension, then we're not talking tactics, we're talking grand strategy. And do you think the Israelis are capable of a strategy that includes a civilian dimension in a serious way? If the Israelis aren't, Hamas is going to fight tooth and nail never to disarm and doesn't give a shit if the Gazans live in dirt and filth for all time. And if they all die, they have a great religious war they have to conduct for the destruction of the Jews and the redemption of Islam. Fine, have fun, enjoy that. But if the Israelis also don't want to move forward with any plan because they can't even figure out what they want. I mean, certain pieces of the government just want all Gazans to pick up and voluntarily choose to go away and disappear. But every. You know, the majority of Israelis don't think that that's something that is an option. And they don't have a policy because they can't ever risk losing the benvirs and smoteches or pieces of the Likud Central Committee, you know, the Likud base. So they can't articulate any kind of thing. So if the Israelis can't move and Hamas can't move, nothing could possibly move and nothing could possibly change. And there's no way to redeploy the army out of Gaza, and there's no way to ever improve anything in Gaza, and there's no future except, you know, a forever war of Hamas that we refuse to separate from the civilian population, and therefore we. We sustain, right? Are the Israelis capable of producing a policy? It's just. It's been three years, and Netanyahu has been promising total victory for three years and delivering. Not that. Not even remotely that. Do you think that can change?

B

First of all, yes, I think it can change, but I think you're right. Like this idea of we can't get it done because we have not defined what getting it done means. What is getting done? Killing every Hamas terrorist, having Hamas surrender, right? Saying, you know what, guys, this armed resistance, we're done, right? In Hebrew we're fine, we're done.

A

We're resetting.

B

This is not going to happen. This is not going to happen. Okay?

A

This is like, so what could happen?

B

And that's what Israel wants. A terrorist organization is not going to disarm. Hamas is not going to surrender. It may disarm slowly, gradually giving up the heavy weapons and then maybe showing a few tunnels. It's sort of like you. You destroy something, you take it down, you build something else. Hamas is not just a terrorist organization. It was the de facto governed. The un. You call it the de facto right, because it's not the maybe sovereign, but it's the de facto. They Control. When people tell me Hamas taxes trucks. Yeah, well, the Israeli government taxes imports, too. They are the government. There is no additional government. It took Hamas 40 years to build and become that movement. It's not going to be, you know, quick to finish them and offer an alternative. But we have to understand. And this isn't. I'm talking. This is the Trump plan. It's not what I say and what I want. It's in the Trump plan. And the Trump plan says that it's going to be a transitional government, and then it's going to start a peace process. And this idea of reformed Palestinian Authority, that maybe it's not Abu Mazen that we don't like, but it's something they will return to Gaza and control. And I don't think this is something. And you know this, that the Israeli leaders, any of the Israeli leaders at the moment, and those are trying to be leaders, or at least before the elections, are coming to the Israeli public and say, you know what? There are other people here. Getting rid of Hamas requires some sort of acknowledgment that is going to be a different Palestinian entity there, and this Palestinian entity is going to be a national entity. It's not going to be just quality of life. And that's what happened with Japan and Germany. They have not lost their flags.

A

I have to tell you, I can't stand stupidity and the question of having a civilian horizon for Gaza the day after plan. We were talking about that on week three, after October 7th. You don't have a day after plan. Means you can't separate the civilians from Hamas, which means you lose. I don't. It's stupidity. It's bad strategy that is unforgivable. I can forgive a lot in the war to destroy Hamas because they actually are coming for my kids. I can't forgive stupidity. And stupidity born of venal political maneuvering. Not even. It's not even the folly of leading something as complex as a war which will always have terrible failures. No one has ever fought a perfect war. Not the famous successful war leaders have never fought perfect wars. Perfect strategically. Never mind the moral questions. Strategically perfect. It's not possible. Napoleon was defeated. Who has ever been better than Napoleon at these things? And he was defeated. But this is dumb, and this is purposefully dumb and dumb because of political windows that don't have to exist. And. And we will fail because of this stupidity. There was this moment in the White House, we've mentioned it before on the podcast, where it was May 8th last year. I think it was Victory in Europe Day. And Trump hosted the German chancellor. And the German chancellor, he turns to him and he says, I forget the video's available on YouTube. People should watch it. But Trump says something like, well, this is a terrible day for you, Mr. Chancellor, because May 8 is victory in Europe Day. And it was such a, like, weird, like, Trumpian like, moment. And the German chancellor says to him in response, something like, this is a glorious day for Germany because this was the birth of the new Germany. Why can't that be the story that comes out of Gaza? And the Israelis can make it so the Israelis can choose that. That's the story.

B

There were some plans during the campaign that said, okay, we will move the civilians to what we call humanitarian bubble. And they were trying to sell them to others. But we came to the Emiratis and we came to the Egyptians, and they were like, wait, but who owns this land and who does? And Israel wanted to separate the civilian population, but under walls where the IDF would guard them. And this did not look very humanitarian. And you didn't have international partners. And the question I'm coming to you with is, basically, I agree with you, we have to separate the population. But if you're expecting Hamas to let them or people to move and Hamas not moving with them, you know, there are some tactical questions, and there's also a strategic question. If we separate the population, are they going to be under our occupation or it would have made sense to have a substitute technocratic body that would govern them in that new space. We have not done that. We thought about the separation, but we thought, oh, it makes a lot of sense to be under a guarding tower of the idf. And that didn't work. You didn't have partners. And also, no one wanted to pay for it. And Israel didn't want to pay for it because of the pressures I mentioned before from the public. So I'm not justifying it, I'm just explaining. But I agree with you.

A

It backfired tremendously to cut through some of these. To cut through some of these exact dilemmas I proposed really unprofessionally and unseriously and off the cuff, but just as an example of the kind of solution that might have existed, building those humanitarian zones in the Negev inside Israel, attached to Gaza, surrounded by the idf, filtered by the Shabak, and maybe even administering them with Israeli Arabs who are Palestinian, speak Palestinian Arabic, and also, you know, would. Would be. Would create a kind of Gazans don't know Israeli Arabs. Like, they meet a little bit Online they don't actually know the palace, the part of the Palestinian people that is not actually radicalized. And I think because they know Israelis, you know, the anti Israel crowd says they're not radicalized because they have citizenship. You give everyone citizenship, there'll be no Hamas and everything will go away. Which literally fails to explain the entirety of Palestinian political history. I mean just all of it. Like, not like the PLO is founded to kill all the Israelis in 64, not in the occup, out against the occupation in 67, Khajamin, et cetera. What Hamas claims it is, which is not that is a religious vision of the Muslim Brotherhood and destroying Zionism. So you know, I don't, I genuinely don't believe that Israeli Arabs are de radicalized because they have citizenship. I believe that they're de radicalized a because the Israelis inside Israel have much more capacity to crush the radicals. The radicals were crushed. The northern movement of the northern branch of the Islamic movement was basically Hamas within the Israeli Arab community. And they were dismantled by Israeli law enforcement and their leaders Raid Saleh, for example, people can look up, went to jail. But also they know Israelis, they work with Israelis, they know Hebrew. Half of Haifa University's student body is Arabs. A quarter of the Technion, Israel's top scientific university, is Arab. And there's no affirmative action. They know what right. They're hospitals. And so they know a few things about Israelis that Gazans don't know, which is one, the Israelis aren't going anywhere. They know that. And that's a powerful point against Hamas's argument because if you knew the Israelis are here to stay, literally everything Hamas is selling Palestinians becomes catastrophic self destruction. And why wouldn't that. You know, that meeting, if it radicalizes some of the Israeli Arabs, we can handle it. And if it doesn't, and if it de radicalizes some of the Gazans, that's the only, that's a positive. We have no other way of doing it. Anyway, I suggested these kinds of things and I was of course thoroughly mocked by people who. We're not wrong. We're not wrong. This is the dumbest idea on earth and might have worked.

B

I offered to put a field hospital like we had with Syria on the border. Also of theirs crossing. The Hamas shattered right to show that we're still taking people said are you crazy? Israelis want to see Palestinians now. So I'm with you. I think it was very difficult in the, in the beginning.

A

I don't forgive it for being difficult. I don't. I Don't I? I. These are incompetent people running this country. I have friends who died in Gaza in this war as soldiers facing Hamas in gun battles. How dare they weasel their way around the actual problem and not actually strive to win. How dare they? They don't have another job in this war. Except that.

B

No, you're 100% right. And winning does not meaning kill another, whoever fakact, a terrorist no one heard of. Right. Like, it just. It's not about that.

A

We should do that for the sheer pleasure of it. If you're an armed Hamas person, you should die. But that's not what winning is. Yeah.

B

That doesn't get you victory. And I think we're confused, right? We're confusing, like killing people and saying things and counting things. Right. The Vietnam. Counting, counting, counting, but not the strategic victory. One of the issues is there is a way forward. I think we can be fatalistic as much. And we are very frustrated at the uni and we share the frustration. What had happened. I think I say this with immense praise to the Trump administration that brought this plan and this plan. Many think tanks, as I said, wrote this plan. And this plan has elements in it that you wouldn't think the Trump administration has proclivity to include, including cooperation with the UN Right. Including Palestinian Authority. Because they sort of understood it's like, okay, we need the cooperation and we need the political cover and we need something to move forward. The vision that you and I have forward. And I think the Trump administration, hopefully, or, I don't know, depends on hopefully, but hopefully that'll shift. I don't want to say anything about Iran and Lebanon at the moment, but the attention to this will come back and they will put all the actors in line again, including Israel, and saying, you know, Israel, this is for you. It's hard for you to see it, but this is for you. And putting the pressure on the mediators on Turkey, Hamas and Egypt to pressure Hamas in a more serious way than we've seen in the last two months. Because Iran did change things in this region, right? Everyone's sort of like, okay, where is this all going to get us back on track? Only Trump administration can have help us help ourselves. Okay. Because I really think it's the best plan for Israel.

A

What is the humanitarian situation of Gazans? Where do they stand? How bad is it? It has been flooded with aid just per person, beyond any, I think, humanitarian aid, you know, situation ever. It's just the immense, immense amounts of aid, but it's more than half, I don't know, maybe 70%. I don't know the actual numbers, but it's certainly more than half are living in tents. What's their situation look like? Is it better than we think? Worse than we think? What can you tell us about that?

B

So I think here the reporting doesn't do justice to the situation. I have to be careful because I don't want to blame anyone. I think that truck number and what's in the truck is reported is not accurate. I think that this idea of 600 trucks going into Gaza every day is a number that was copied from a protocol of a ceasefire generation. Just like copy paste into these things, but never thought through because Gaza does not need 600 trucks of what is allowed to come in at the moment. So you're saying it's flooded with aid, it's flooded with calories that come from staple foods that enter Gaza. But humanitarian, humanitarian and I'm not a humanitarian thing, but I've worked in this space. Enough is not just getting calories across. Kerem Shalom crossing into Gaza, that's not humanitarian. We have a policy because we have never.

A

You mean it's all carbo. You mean it's all carbohydrates?

B

You mean it's mostly carbohydrates? Because also there's no cold chain because of dual use components. Dual use is stuff that can build of the refrigerator and military purposes. There's no cold chain, so it's very difficult.

A

So there's no meat, no milk, no

B

vegetables, meat and all these things. The Gaza's are very innovative. So there's. We're seeing some vegetables that they're growing, but not in the masses. Fishing has not resumed, so but we're seeing mostly food that comes in. There needs to be the energy needs to cook this food right, because most people. And also community kitchens to support it. But that's not on the food stuff. I can tell you that we are seeing indicators that the food security situation, which was really which had improved substantially in Gaza after the ceasefire, there are signs now that it's not as good as was before. I hope we're not going to see any. I don't think there's famine in Gaza and all that stuff, but when you talk about food security and you talk about children for three years have not eaten a diversity of food. I'm not talking just quantities. This is going to have implications. But that's food. The trash, solid trash that I spoke about, there are mountains and mountains of trash. According to the statistics now There are over 4 million rats and mice in Gaza. I don't know who counted.

A

I'm sorry, just to clarify, there are rats and mice in Tel Aviv. Can you explain to us the difference? It's not everybody in a New York subway has seen a rat. How bad is New York City?

B

Don't live on the street.

A

Okay, so how bad is this Is the round in my situation, Is there a metric?

B

The reports are that. The reports are. And again it's reporting from Gaza. A lot of it is the UN a lot of self reporting, a lot of this. But we are seeing the pictures that they're rodent bites affecting children in Gaza every day. It's a daily thing and Israel knows this. This is why Israel now started sending in traps and pesticides. But you know now when you have so much trash and tunnels and stuff, as you said, it can happen. You will have rats and mice when you.

A

The Israeli response is enough, it's adequate. Was it 10% of what's needed? Is it 70%? Are they trying properly?

B

I would lie if I told you that I have the exact numbers. I think it is very difficult to handle a big rodent population if you don't, if you don't have the people in housing. So even if we have enough traps, the fact is, and as you said, it's more I think depending on the number. But over 80% of Gaza's population is displaced. Many of them are leaving and many I'm talking everyone have leaving in tents and idp internally displaced camps. Camps that have no housing. It's tents. The tents are not durable tents but in tents. So rodents come in and then there are a lot of people and these are different numbers. They still roughly built area of Gaza, right? There's some buildings that were not completely destroyed where people are just turning them into makeshift housing. So they're putting like scraps of plastic around to turn some something as full walls. But there's a big shelter issue, There is a big power issue. There's not enough energy for a variety of needs in the displaced camps. I know for a fact and it's reporting because we know it's dark at night. There's a lot of sexual violence and abuse which always happens in those things. Not particularly to Gaza. We know this from other places in the world. But it's difficult to get in lighting equipment because of dual use considerations. There are field hospitals, but the big hospitals providing the services. Obviously because they were used as a refuge for Hamas and safe haven for Hamas, they are destroyed. I think there is a solution by the way there's the European hospital, which is in the Israeli health zone. It can be rehabilitated. This is a way to get the Europeans in. Right. You know, the Palestinians still like sick with cancer and other things. Schools, despite what Israelis might think that we're done with unrwa, the refugee agency, we're not. UNRWA is still functioning in Gaza. There are 11,000 employees, I think so a little bit less than what they had before. They're not another government in Gaza, but they still operating schools. Hamas is operating other schools. There are the schools. So children are not getting the education they needed, but they get something, they

A

get the wrong thing.

B

Terrible. It's terrible. There's not enough water or enough clean water, sanitation. And it's an issue because I think, and I've heard and I've worked in this space on dual use stuff that for me. Soap, you can make a bomb. But I'm looking at Gaza and I'm saying there's so much munitions in the ground, Hamas can turn so much of our stuff into bombs. Get the soap in.

A

Let's wind down, I guess. There's so much more to talk about. The international force that's supposed to come into police Gaza, where does that stand? What nations are involved? Is Turkey managing to finagle its way in? Is this thing a dead letter? I When the Israeli government says the international forces probably, you know, doesn't want this guy and that guy in the international force. I am 100% on Bibi's side on this. They will only ever be human shields. In the case of the Turks or the Qataris, they will want to be human shields for Hamas. And in the case even of the Saudis and the Maraudis, who don't have any love lost for Hamas, but they still politically won't be able to actually engage Hamas in the battle. So they're not meaningful, useful. They will just be running coverage. So is that an issue that is moving forward in any way? What can you tell us about that?

B

So, first of all, you know, Qatar, Saudi, uae. I mean, with all due respect, they don't have really militaries and they're not going to send forces. That was never the thing. Turkey is a big issue and Israel has a red line, which I agree with you. It should have drawn. The countries that have said that they would send soldiers to the stabilization force. We could talk about the mandate have been Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan. There's some countries in Africa talking about the first that arrived. We have actually a few Moroccans that are now in the CMCC and Kiryatkat, where the structure that I mentioned, it's not a combatant team, it's sort of like a forward team, but it takes time. You have to hear another thing that should be done before the Israeli elections, right? You sign the Status of Forces Agreement, the something called sofa, to enable the forces to come and they have to coordinate between them and define their mandate very well. What are they going to do? Because if they're all going to just like be there next to the idf, I'm not sure all these countries want to be there. If they are. The idea is that the IDF deploys from a pilot, right? And we can talk about the way forward. Like how I would go about it is. But if they pull and the ISF goes in and they're working with this NCAG police right, to support them with law and order, then it makes sense, the mandate. But someone has to clarify the mandate. And this is something that the US is leading the stabilization force. But here also, I mean, this was a report in the news. I'm not saying anything from the inside information. There was a forward deployment mission of the isf, the International Stabilization Force. A few dozens of people were supposed to come here and go to Kerem Shalom and Southern Rafah just to see where they're going to be. And who didn't let them go in, do you think?

A

The Egyptians.

B

Wow.

A

Dang it.

B

Because this is a reward for Hamas. Can you explain to me how a stabilization force is supposed to replace Hamas is a reward for Hamas? This is the politics that is getting into.

A

If they're playing politics to avoid international forces, can you blame them? The Israelis? Let me put it a different way. I have never seen, not as a soldier deployed on a border, including looking across the Lebanese border at UNIFIL positions 25 years ago, as a young man in uniform, I have never, ever seen international forces that were useful for any goddamn thing. Ever. Not ever. The separation forces on the Golan. As soon as the Jabhat Al Nusra is coming down the Golan plateau in the civil war, I think in 2014 or 2015, those separation forces run behind the IDF line. We were protecting them. They were not separating us from the Syrians. Nasser kicks out the UN forces in the Sinai. Abba Eben says the UN is an umbrella that doesn't work in the rain. You know, UNIFIL in Lebanon covered for Hezbollah. Tunnel building was literally just the places where Israel couldn't bomb. That's where Hezbollah built tunnel installations under those bases. Every UNIFIL person knew it. No UNIFIL person would ever engage. So UNIFIL functioned as Hezbollah's cover, not the people, despite UN resolutions, Security Council resolutions demanding that what UNIFIL actually do is disarm Hezbollah. So UN forces, international forces, they never possibly, by the way, the best of the best American forces to whom I would salute as they walk past in the street. My love for them is passionate and deep and old. They're not going to lose men and bleed in the streets of Gaza to fight Hamas. Why should they? I don't want them to. So even in the best case scenario of a military that can engage, that can fight a war, not the Irish military, in the case of the Syrian situation where the Irish forces just ran behind the Israeli line or the Fijian military was deployed at one point in the Golan. But let's imagine it's the Americans. If they would fight, I don't want them to fight my fight against Gaza and against Khalid. I don't want their boys falling in Gaza. So if I find out that Netanyahu is dragging his feet because he's trying to finagle all kinds of ways to prevent this from happening, isn't that a good thing? In asking this question, I think I represent 96.3% of Israelis. I'm joking about that number, but I think I represent all Israeli skeptical on this. Are we wrong?

B

I think this goes to the definition of what this force does. First of all, this force was never designed as a peacekeeping force of a UN peacekeeping force. Even though there's a UN Security Council resolution, the mandate of this force is not to disarm. And they said they're not going to finish the job for you. It's not their expectations. You align expectations in terms of the Israelis. This force is supposed to help with monitoring humanitarian aid. Very clear definitions. Working with the technocratic police on law and order and notify on different violations. Maybe, maybe, maybe. And this big question, you add a verifying component of disarmament that is happening in consent with Hamas. If Hamas says, okay, here is the landscape of here's a tunnel here and someone goes to blows the tunnel, I assume it's Israel and you know, managing collection sites for arms and stuff. It's about how you define them. This idea of like having an effective force, of course not. But won't they get in the way? But this is part of the plan.

A

That makes sense that they'll do those roles. But won't they get in the way of potential IDF need to carry out Combat operations. There's no way, even in the best case scenario, that any of these plans move forward without Hamas trying to look like it still isn't defeated by killing more IDF soldiers or launching rockets from Gaza or something to show they exist. And then the IDF has to go after them. Won't these guys still get in the way?

B

So on the operational dimensions, I think there are ways to do this. It depends where are deployed and what they actually do. And since we are not there, and there's an argument, but I gotta tell you, we have a model in the west bank, okay, that Israel refused to accept for Gaza, right? It was no Hamas and no Palestinian Authority and no UN and no this and no occupation. And guess what? We got everything got Hamas, we got the PA in the back door, we got the UN and we got Israeli occupation all at once. Speak about anti talent, right? Like, we got all this, all the nos we got together. I don't know how they can coexist in the West Bank. You don't have a stabilization force, right? You don't have internal. The internalization of the conflict, right? It's not international between two parties. And Israel has a coordination mechanism with the Palestinian Authority forces where despite everything that they tell you, the security coordination is intact. And you go in and you pick up the phone and you say, I go in now to Ramallah or to wherever you want. You go 10 times a day now. And then you don't need an isf, you don't need an international stabilization force. But Israel refused to have the Palestinian Authority in Gaza try to help us disarm Palestinians like they don't do. We refused for the reasons I mentioned before, because we have a blind spot to the fact that there are Palestinians here and maybe they're a little bit different in Gaza and they're on the west bank, but they all call themselves Palestinians. We have this model optional. We said no.

A

You think the PA could be a working model for Gaza?

B

I mean, I'm not the only one saying the people from the Shin Bet. I think it could be, maybe not now. You have to strengthen the Palestinian Authority, their forces, they have to be trusted. They have to be, not corrupt. But there's one thing that we share with the Palestinian Authority is the hatred for Hamas. We hate that they're not doing it because they're Zionists. They're fighting Hamas because they're jeopardizing them. So I see the ISF here not as the substitute, because it's in the Trump administration plan, right? It's all Temporary, until we can figure out how the PA becomes, you know, Biden called it like revitalized Palestinian Authority. I say rpa. I say cpa. Like an accountant. Right? Competent Palestinian Authority. How we have a competent Palestinian Authority? That is point. It's the end of the plan that we can bring in and get these Indonesians out, get them all also. We don't want them here. We don't want this. I don't want to be this high maintenance partner of people. I don't want Israeli stories in the New York Times every day. We don't want that. Right? I mean, I, I don't. You just want to leave in peace. We all just want to leave in peace. And I don't want my three boys to serve in gossip. I really don't.

A

Okay, let's. Let's wind down. We have. I think, I think our therapy session is over.

B

Yeah,

A

I don't know. I don't think we agree on everything, but I certainly think our basic sense of where this government screwed up is the same. Can you leave us with optimism? What would be a good way forward? Why? You work on this every day. You work with these people every day you walk into the halls of power, whether it's in advising, I don't know what, the Israeli army, the Israeli government, Mladinov himself on the ground. And you're not slowing down. So you obviously think this is not a waste of time. Why should we be hopeful with the acknowledgment that it's the Middle East? So, you know, nine times out of 10 it'll fail, but one time out of 10 is enough to sustain a nation state for the Jews in this land and in this region. Why should we be hopeful? Why are you hopeful?

B

First of all, I just don't think we have a better option. I really don't have. And we didn't get to talk about Lebanon, but unlike the agreement in Lebanon, I think it's a little bit too good to be implemented without resistance here. Everyone is making concessions in this plan. Israel also is making concessions in this plan. And that's why I think it's a good plan. We don't have a Plan B. Unless Plan B is occupying all of Gaza for decades to come or going back to war. That I don't necessarily think that where we are and how the IEF thinks, with all the criticism that you put before, we'll be able to do a better job than we did far better last time. Not to mention that we don't have international backing for this for Going back to full war in Gaza. And we need international backing because we need munitions and we need legitimacy and we need all these other things. So that's why I keep at it. I also think not all things are lost. I think our biggest asset here is that we have the Trump administration still committed to this plan, and they're still committed to this plan. The fact that it is an achievement in the Middle east that they have to do. The fact that we have regional countries and, you know, we can poop on the. You know, we can talk about the Saudis and the. And all these, like, the bad Qataris, and we can do all that, but the fact is that we all tried, we tried to, like, sideline the Palestinian issue, and it didn't work. Everyone here in this region wants to help make sure that this doesn't happen again. Because it ruins the world. Right? It affects them also. It's not just for Israelis and Palestinians. It affects everyone in the world. So I'm hopeful because I think there is a way to enlist everyone. And you had this momentum and you have this support. And what do I do? I think we start with what can be done to prepare the ground before the Israeli elections. And I said a few things that can be done before, you know, I can repeat them, but it's on the technocratic committee and, you know, just preparing the structure and not giving Hamas the reason. It's an excuse. But Hamas says Israel doesn't fulfill its phase one commitments. They're right. Phase one commitments are not taking more territory of Gaza. Phase one commitments are making sure that the medical evacuation process is continuing. I mean, we're not.

A

I'm sorry, I have family members right now deployed in Gaza. They have one of them, his specific position was attacked by Hamas. Hamas does not for one second acquiesce to the actual demands of the plan.

B

Sides are violating the terms of the ceasefire.

A

But if they're violating, why do we need to. Why do we.

B

No, no, I'm not saying you can preempt threats, okay? You can preempt threats taking more territory, explicitly and in political way. This is not part of the deal. It's not preempting threats or responding to threats, okay? You attack them, kill anyone who's getting near you, making you see someone on a motorcycle that you know is a suspect, take him out, which we're doing.

A

Couldn't it help to actually come to the table? But couldn't it pressure Hamas to come to the table? Because it's clarifying to them they still have what to Lose. The Israeli side has not been completely reined in by Trump and Hamas can just sit tight. Isn't that, isn't that a useful.

B

There are conversations in Cairo all the time with Hamas. So they're still at the table. And they're not stupid people. They have not said no. They're saying yes, but. So they're still at the table. Maybe. I think the threat of war is something that is really important to keep a credible threat of war, which is we're certainly doing. But are they, are we giving them something to exploit? Yes, but more important is we're going to have elections. And I'm not listening to what anyone got. The Eisenhower. Whatever they say now, they just want to win. But I think it will be an opportunity after the elections to recommit the Israeli government to the 20 point plan. All of it, all points, including starting the easiest one with point 17, which I mentioned is like, okay, Hamas is saying delaying, let's build that other part of Gaza which we control. What's the reason? Because we don't want pictures coming from Gaza of like Gazans who are having different life. That's the story that you tell. It's a story that the Israelis should be okay with. We have to tell that story. So that's one thing. And we have to remember, Israel never committed to this plan. Israel sort of agreed to the ceasefire. Right. What was brought to a cabinet vote was the terms of the ceasefire. Bringing the hostages back on, releasing the prisoners, withdrawing the IDF to the TL Ali. We never had a discussion of what it means. All along the lines of this plan. We need to have this plan in the media. You know, Amit Segal, who's, you know, someone I respect, he said we will never get there. Well, if we are serious about this, we have to think about this. And once you recommit the Israeli government to the plan, then you can move forward with so much of this, so many of these components, starting with the Green Zone, what we call. And in the miraculous, this event that Hamas is convinced that it's in their benefit to begin a disarmament process that's going to be very, very long. I said the ira, you had Tony Blair, you had England, you had functioning things. Took seven years to decommission. It will take a long time. In this one in lifetime opportunity that we have, then we're in for something better. But either way, is this better than returning to war? I mean, I think absolutely, yes.

A

Shira Efron. Dr. Shira Efron, thank you so much for joining me. I learned a lot. So thank you for that and for enlightening us on what actually is going on and what the potential is. Thanks for joining me.

B

Thank you. Good luck to all of us. Their success is our success.