A

Over the past couple of years, CallMeBack has grown into something much bigger than we ever expected, a place for clarity, context, and honest conversations at a time when those things can seem hard to find. That's what ARC Media is all about, building a truly independent voice, which means no one shaping what we say or how we say it. To help support our rapidly expanding operations, we created Inside Call Me Back our Members Only feed. If Call Me Back has been meaningful to you and you want to be part of what we're building, I hope you'll join us. You can subscribe@arcmedia.org or through the link in the show Notes and to our insiders. Thank you. You are listening to an art media podcast.

B

This is a revolutionary regime. It's burying its leader that was killed in an Israeli strike sanctioned by the United States. So they are in no mood for compromises right now on what they see as an agreement that gave them a lot of advantages. It's plausible that the Iranians themselves think that now is their time to escalate.

A

11:30am on Wednesday, July 8 here in New York City it's 6:30pm on Wednesday, July 8 in Israel where Rahm Emanuel, a possible 2028 presidential candidate, just delivered what some are characterizing as a quote unquote tough love speech regarding the future of the US Israel relationship. We will have a lot more to say in the coming days when Rahm joins me for a conversation on Call Me Back. Five weeks ago, a Memorandum of understanding otherwise called the mou was signed between the United States and Iran that was meant to close out the war, reopen the Strait of Hormuz and give a battered Islamic Republic of Iran a path back into the world. That was May 25th. Yesterday, Tuesday it came apart in the course of 24 hours, three tankers were hit in the Strait of Hormuz, a Qatari gas carrier, a Saudi vessel and and a third vessel, Doha and Riyadh. Both blame Iran. U.S. central Command answered with a new wave of strikes. More than 80 targets, air defenses, radar sites, IRGC, small boats and Washington revoked the oil sanctions waiver it had extended Tehran under the deal. Standing in Ankara, Turkey, President Trump flatly said the MOU is, quote, over, though he left the door open to more talks, although he is now threatening additional strikes. Yet U.S. defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's first visit to Israel as Pentagon chief was abruptly canceled amid the tension over a possible F35 sale to Turkey. And all of this is unfolding during the days long funeral of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. So with the MoU all but dead, what comes next? A third round of open war? A contained exchange both sides want to walk back from? Or something messier, something in between. And what does this all mean for the US For Iran, and for Turkey, which is trying to assert itself in the region? ARC media contributor and senior analyst for Yidiot Ahronot Nadavael joins us to make sense of all of it. And there's a lot right after this quick message.

C

I'm Deborah Pardes, the host of ARC News Daily. What's happening in Israel and the Jewish world right now matters, but it can be hard to keep up, let alone make sense of it all. That's why we started ARC News Daily. Every weekday morning, I walk you through the most important news, give you the context you need, and let you know what to look out for next. I don't try to convince you of anything and I don't waste your time. On most days, I'll be in your ears for about 10 minutes or less. Then you can move on with your day, hopefully a little bit smarter than before. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts or follow the link in the show notes. I hope to see you tomorrow.

A

Nadav, welcome back.

B

Thanks for having me, Dan.

A

So in the space of a day, three tankers were hit in the Strait of Hormuz. The US answered with strikes on more than 80 Iranian targets, as I mentioned in the intro, and also revoked the oil sanctions waiver. And President Trump told reporters in ankara that the MoU is over. So where are we right now?

B

The MoU was a flawed product to begin with, and we are now seeing the price for that flawed product. And what we are seeing now is how the Iranians are analyzing are interpreting the MoU. They see the MoU as allowing them to control the movement in Hormuz to a certain degree. The United States has a completely different interpretation to what the MOU is, an interpretation that was put forward by the president basically saying that movement should be completely free. And Hormuz, the Iranians never accepted that and they are trying to assert their control over the Strait of Hormuz. As far as they are concerned, it's not business as usual and it will never return to what it was before the war.

A

Nadav, help me understand this. Why would Tehran torch the exact deal it fought for by hitting tankers in Hormuz? Or is Tehran under the impression this is within the bounds of the agreement?

B

Iran sees itself at the peak of its regional influence after the war it sees leaders from all across the region, including Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, coming to show their respect to Ali Khamenei in his funeral. They think that the US Is in a weak position. They think that the President can't really reignite the war because of the midterm elections and because of the status of the economy. And they are trying to use that now. Again, if you look at the language of the agreement, there is no clause in the agreement, the mou, that says everything will just return to how it was before the war. It does say, literally, that Oman and Iran will discuss, I'm paraphrasing, the arrangements for movements in Hormuz, which gives the Iranians and Tehran the reason to assume that they can actually do that. These tankers that were hit, Dan, were hit, as far as the Iranians are concerned, because they tried to move closer to the Omani side of the strait and not at the corridor, the maritime corridor that was assigned to them, according to the Iranians. So what the Iranians are trying to do is to use what they see as a point of weakness of the US together with the language of the MoU, to make sure that they have some sort of a sovereignty or control over the Strait of Hormuz. And the game that they are playing here is the game of trying to maintain their position as a regional power. The first sentences in the MoU contain language that actually adheres to the idea that Iran has some sort of leverage in Lebanon, for instance. So as far as they are concerned, it's the US that is in some sort of violation on the one hand. On the other hand, they are also, and we should take this into account, this is a revolutionary regime. It's burying its leader that was killed in an Israeli strike sanctioned by the United States. So they are in no mood for compromises right now on what they see as an agreement that gave them a lot of advantages.

A

Who's calling the shots in Tehran right now? And based on that, what are some probable scenarios moving forward?

B

My intelligence sources and other sources are saying that there is a power struggle in Tehran. You have Mujtabenei, who is calling some of the shots. Many decisions are not even brought to him. There are still security issues. He has not shown himself in the funeral because of these security issues. He's probably also very badly injured himself. That's also an issue. And there's the Revolutionary Guard. The Revolutionary Guard has a sect within it that is very extreme. They think that the US could actually be thrown out of the region as a result of this war. They don't think that the agreement as of itself, the MOU as of itself, was a good decision by the Iranian leadership. We're seeing criticism of the President of Iran, who's considered a moderate. If you compare him to the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, Mujtaba Khamenei, the sun, or if you compare him to the irgc. The most important power that is pulling in Iran right now is the irgc, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. But again, within the irgc, there are different factions that are in operation in relation to that. Iran has just threatened that it will hit double the number of targets that the US Will hit, if indeed it will do this again in the next 24 hours. It's the Israeli intelligence assessment that the MoU will not completely collapse and that the war will not reignite in an extreme way until November. This is what the Israeli intelligence is now assessing in Israel. The assessment is we are not returning to full blown war, at least until November.

A

Okay, you have said here in the past, Nadav, that Israel has very little leverage in Washington right now as it relates to what has been playing out in the dialogue between Tehran and Washington. With the MOU dead or kind of dead or half dead, what is Israel's strategy with regard to Iran now?

B

Well, first of all, it's not a strategy. It's we told you so. So the Israelis are enjoying this moment of we told you so, right?

A

I'm not sure they're enjoying it.

B

Well, you know, but they feel vindicated. They feel vindicated in the sense that they have told the United States, never sign an agreement with Iranians after a ceasefire, even a temporary ceasefire. You need to continue the war until you get an agreement with these guys. Because if you stop the war to neg, they will see this as a show of weakness. And I've written about this extensively before the decision to stop and negotiate, this was the Israeli position, on the other hand, and I want to say something here, with all due respect to the Israeli position, and I'm Israeli, of course, can absolutely see the points that were made by the President. It's not only about Iran. The United States needs to maintain a world order, a global economy. The President has been absolutely clear and he has said so. He has used the words 1929. He has used the word depression to explain why he needed to sign the agreement. So he was definitely looking at energy prices. He was looking at global economy. And people in Washington would add he was looking, and it's absolutely legitimate to the domestic political sphere in the US and because of that, he needed to make a decision. And he also knew that he can always go back to the war. And we have just seen a testament to that in the last 24 hours when the US army has hit dozens and dozens of targets in Iran in response to the Iranian violations. So there were many people also on this show. I think Mark Dubovitz was one of them. But many others that thought that the MOU is so flawed to some extent or the Iranians are so resolved, Dan, not to actually follow through that it's going to collapse anyway. It's just a matter of time. And by the way, this is what I heard from Israeli decision makers. They told me, look, this MoU will not mature to a full fledged agreement. It's not going to happen because we know what the Iranians are willing to give insofar from their nuclear program without even going to the issue of Hormuz. But right now, Hormuz is the issue.

A

Nadav, one complicating factor is the newish player on the chessboard or maybe the newest member of the old players in the chessboard, which is Turkey. And before we drill down on the details, how should we understand Turkey's position on the Middle east chessboard right now?

B

The story of the NATO summit in Turkey is a symbol to what Israel sees right now as one of its main threats in the region. And the reason is that Turkey sees everything that is happening as going its way, rising to the status of not only a regional power, it's already a regional power, but as far as they see it, a world power again. And Dan, one of the things that you could see in the ceremonies for the leaders that came to the NATO summit in Ankara is the usage of Ottoman, the Ottoman Empire symbols in the ceremonies that were prepared by the Erdogan regime. To your question, Turkey is now a key player in Syria. It's a key player in Lebanon. It assisted in the ending of the war in Gaza and getting the hostages back. And this is a credit that they got from President Trump himself to thank President Erdogan. They were also helpful in getting the MOU with Iran. The fact that this current US Administration is extremely happy. This is what the president has just said in Ankara, meeting the leader of Syria with what's happening in Syria. He credits Turkey for that. And because of that and many other reasons, they are a rising power. And by rising power, let me give you a bit of data about that. So first of all, Turkey has the second largest army in NATO. It has more than 350,000 active personnel. And it wants to join some EU programs, defense programs that are substantial. Its defense industry is currently globally ranked. Number 11, by the way, Israel. I knew that you would ask where Israel is, Dan. So it's number eight.

A

Ranked by who?

B

Ranked by sipri. What SIPRI does, it measures the percentage of a country in global arms exports. Turkish defense exports increased sharply in recent years. They've been exporting a lot of drones to Ukraine. It's building warships for Ukraine, and it spent about $30 billion on defense in 20. So if you look at this, this is more than the combined defense budgets of Greece, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Georgia, all countries that are in the region of Turkey. So Turkey is deemed by the west, like it or not, as a force rising. The fact that it has its campaigns against the Kurds or Erdogan is an authoritarian leader that is of less interest to leaders of the west right now.

A

We'll be right back.

D

Hi, I'm Daniil Hartman, president of the Sholem Hartman Institute in Jerusalem. And I'm Yossi Klein Halevi, senior fellow at the Sholem Hartman Institute. What's more important, to be feared by your enemies or morally true to yourself? Should Israel strive to be a nation among nations? Or should it accept the fact that it is now a fortress apart? What do Israelis and Diaspora Jews owe each other? If you're Jewish or a friend, an ally, these questions have been gnawing at you these past few years. For some of you, like for us, these questions have been keeping you up at night. And for some, they've been simmering in the background, waiting for answers. But dilemmas don't always have clear answers. What they do deserve are honest and respectful debates. And as it happens, Yossia and I love to challenge each other to get to the bottom of things. We look at current events through a lens that speaks to us most deeply, a Jewish lens. So if today's Jewish dilemmas are on your mind, tune in to our conversation on For Heaven's Sake, a partnership between ARC Media and the Sholem Hartman Institute. You can find For Heaven's Sake on Apple, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcast. Us see you there.

A

And we're back with Nadaviel. So as it relates to Turkey, Nadav, just looking at current events, very current, there are two recent developments. One is, a few days ago, Turkey's Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan declared that Israel has become, quote, a burden that humanity can no longer bear. A burden that humanity can no longer bear. You can obviously extrapolate out what the Implications of that observation are. And two, President Trump seems to be rolling back turkey into the F35 program, meaning getting, you know, he can't do it unilaterally, but establishing a process by which the US F35s are sold to Turkey. What is the significance of these developments for Israel?

B

So, first of all, it's a bit of an understatement the way that you describe, I think, what the Turkish foreign minister said and you left it to me, Dan, that's fine.

A

Yeah, well, that's why we have you here.

B

So he went full blown Hitler on Israel. It's not only that sentence. It was an entire rabid monologue on a TV interview about Israel. Now the Turks are saying, he didn't speak about Israel as a country, he spoke about the people controlling Israel, that burden on the world. And he did say at the end the world needs to sanction. So he didn't go for a final solution type of rhetoric at the end. This is just rhetoric that we know really from the 1930s. And people who listen to us know that I don't bring that card of anti Semitism and law to international relations. So that's very worrying. And the beef between Israel and Turkey, and Israel specifically and the Erdogan regime has been going on for a really long time. We're not going to get into that. As to the F35, I think people don't remember what happened with the F35. Turkey was part of this project because it was a senior member of NATO. And at a certain point, Erdogan, in one of his fits of anger, decided that the US collaborated with the attempted coup against him. And as revenge, quote, unquote, he decided that Turkey will purchase S400 Russian anti aircraft radar systems, it's defense systems against fighter jets and bombers. And According to the F35 regulation, it's impossible for a country to both trade with Russia in highly sophisticated anti aircraft systems and be part of the project. So the Turks were kicked out of the F35 project. Now, what happened is that they discovered that with all due respect to Erdogan's fits of anger and rage, they have an air force that works only with NATO and is comprised of basically almost only Western equipment and of course, US Fighter jets. So what do you do now? Because the US didn't want even to supply the Turks with replacements to these fighter jets and there began an entire crisis for Turkey that they worked away in Washington for years trying to get back onto the F35 project. The Israelis are, I don't want to say terrified, but are extremely troubled of the possibility that Turkey is going to get F35s because it will completely erode the qualitative edge that Israel has in the region. Now, here comes the really interesting development, Dan, and I'll be happy to hear what you think about that. Prime Minister Netanyahu began an open campaign against the US supplying Turkey with F35s. And as far as I remember, it's the first time that the prime minister is in a direct confrontation with this administration as to a significant decision that the president has already made and he has said so to supply them with those fighter jets. Now, I'm asking you, Dan, I don't know how to read this, but he is campaigning like he would have campaigned against President Obama.

A

Well, yes and no. So he had a very direct interview on this topic or direct exchange with Dana Bash on CNN yesterday. He was on Fox. So you're right, he is doing a series of interviews. I can't remember the last time he's been so directly confrontational on an issue during the Trump administration. But I think the tone of it is different than his typical exchanges where there's disagreements with the US under other administrations. If you, you know, you watch these interviews in full, he talks about how he and President Trump are completely aligned and they agree on 99% of. And he's extremely deferential to President Trump. But, and then he lays out these criticisms and lays out why what the US Is doing with Turkey is so problematic and why Turkey. I mean, that's his real target, why Turkey and Erdogan are so problematic. So I agree with you. It is surprising he has, I've not seen him do anything like this during this Trump administration or even the last one, on the one hand. On the other hand, the tone of it is different than when Prime Minister Netanyahu has gone head to head with other presidents.

B

Yeah. So now comes also the question, does Netanyahu think that maybe in Washington today or towards the midterms he can actually block the sale? And to that, again, one needs to be fair. The US Commitment by law to Israel's edge in the region is in the Middle East. And it never extended to Turkey. It was never extended to Turkey because Turkey is part of NATO. So it's not really a demand that the Israelis can make without making some specific arguments as to Erdogan's affinity, for instance, for political Islamism, which is just a fact, or his authoritarian rule or his threats against Israel or the anti Semitism of his regime. And it's a big question. If Netanyahu is doing that, though, he knows he's going to fail and it's because of the Israeli elections or because he feels that he can actually pull strings in Washington, D.C. to basically slow this down down to a deadlock. I think it's probably the latter.

A

And what is Israel's Turkey strategy? I mean, we've done a few episodes on this Nadav over the last few years, and I keep being told that Israel and the Israeli security establishment and the intelligence community is investing in a way that is unprecedented or has not done for many years with regard to Turkey. So there is obviously this increased focus on Turkey. How would you characterize just Israel's the overall kind of doctrine now as it relates to dealing with Turkey?

B

Israel sees Turkey as the rising threat in the region to Israeli dominance, mainly in the north, in Lebanon and in Syria. And it's increasingly worried about Turkey becoming the sort of an overreaching empire of sorts that reaches its own borders. And because of that, the Israeli Defense Administration is preparing for a possible confrontation, if not with Turkey, with forces that are aligned with Turkey, for instance, forces that are within the Syrian regime. And that's a good example. So one of the quotes I've been hearing is that the Golan Heights today is not a border between Israel and Syria. It's a border between Israel and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president, the leader of Turkey. So that's how it's seen. Now, between what I just said and between a strategy, there's a long stretch, and I don't think that anyone in Israel actually walked down that path of developing a strategy. Considering again that for many in the west, specifically in Europe, I remind people listening to us, it was Turkey that allowed the refugee crisis in Europe to happen.

A

Say more about that. What do you mean by that?

B

So it was Turkey that allowed in 2014-2016 for the refugee crisis in Europe to happen, because it allowed Syrians to pass through Turkey into the eu. And we know that it knowingly allowed them. I was there, by the way. I traveled with these Syrian refugees when they crossed the sea, when they entered Europe. And I heard that from them and how the Turkish authorities allowed this to happen. But it was Turkey to which Angela Merkel, as the chancellor of Germany, turned to to stop that stream of hundreds of thousands and millions of refugees coming from the Middle east, not only from Syria, by the way, also from Iraq. And it was Erdoan that decided to stop it. It almost stopped immediately as a result of Erdoan's decision. So that's. That's an example of how Turkey can play the west, and it does that very efficiently. And unlike other countries, for instance, you don't read a lot of stories about how Turkey is pushing extremism in the West. Right. You're not reading a lot of stories like Qatar, for instance, you don't read a lot of story about how Turkish fundamentalism is spreading through America or anything like that. That's because Turkey doesn't allow much of this. So they're operating in a much more moderate, to some extent, but I would say more wise way also in the region. And one should remember that for hundreds of years, Turkey was the overruling empire that ruled the entire Middle East. And Erdogan sees himself as a new sultan, a new Ottoman king, for that matter, who will restore Turkish eminence in the region.

A

When you talk to your Israeli sources, what do they understand? The US Perception of Turkey and more generally, the West's perception of Turkey, NATO's perception of Turkey. Is there anyone in the kind of in Western capitals or at the NATO headquarters that have the same concerns or their radar up about Erdogan that Jerusalem does?

B

I don't think so, frankly. I don't think so. And here's why.

A

Really?

B

Yeah. I don't think that people are too worried about Turkey. Sometimes they're worried in Europe about Turkey because of the local diasporas of Turkey that are at times controlled from Ankara and their political sway.

A

Meaning. Just understand. So if you're in France or Germany or some of these other European countries, especially in Germany, there is a large Turkish community, and they're very active in the politics of the particular European country. And so you're saying that their connection to Istanbul, to the leadership in Turkey, whether it's direct or just a more of a vibe thing, the governments in these European countries are reticent to get crosswired with Istanbul, of course, because these

B

communities, these people vote, they're citizens. So you need to take them into account. They are diasporas within the country. So that's important. But let me put it this way. If you are a liberal and you want to fight Putin and you want to have Putin in trouble because of Ukraine, you want to support Turkey, it's Turkey that is supplying exports to the Ukraine, and it's Turkey that always stood in the way of the Russians, historically speaking. Right. But if you're on the other side, and you're, for instance, a populist, nationalist right winger. So Erdogan has a lot of ideas that you can actually relate to as long as Erdogan keeps his Islamism at bay and at home. Which Turkey actually does. Now, look, if you need to decide in the region, in the Middle east, what do you have, you have countries like Saudi Arabia that is rich on oil, but doesn't have real power in terms of an army or population. You have Iran. Iran, by its DNA, it's a radical terror exporting country. You have Turkey and you have Israel. And Turkey is much more representative of the area of the near east than Israel. It's much bigger than Israel. It produces, produces cars and its arms industry and everything else. So you want to be in good connections with the Turks. Israel had great connections with the Turks. Israel had great connections with Erdogan. The security apparatus of Israel and the security apparatus of Turkey, until lately, have been speaking in such an intimate way, cooperating. If people would have known in Istanbul and Ankara what type of relationship was built between the Israeli Mossad and their counterparts in Turkey, Israeli King Bet and their counterparts in Turkey, I think they'll be stunned because it's the same government, the same Erdogan, that has been badmouthing Israel and by the way, the Jewish people to some extent himself.

A

I would just go a step farther. When I was working on Capitol hill in the 90s and even the beginning of the Bush administration, but certainly Bush 43, but in the 90s, I remember the Israeli government in Washington doing the bidding for the Turkish government. People are going to hear this and they're going to over interpret what I'm saying or take it out of context. So please just try to choose my words very carefully. It was as though the Israeli government was a lobbying organ of the Turkish government in Washington that Erdogan and the Turkish government used to great effect. And it was Israel was willing to do this for the reasons you're saying, that Israel didn't have many relationships like it had with Istanbul in the region. The depth of the relationship felt to me almost the way we talk about the Israeli Emirati relationship today, where there's total strategic alignment on a range of issues. And Israelis were traveling back and forth to Turkey all the time. There was business activity back and forth, and then there was this security, as you're saying, a security intelligence relationship. And it extended to them cooperating as a united front in Washington.

B

Turkey was the country of choice for Israelis for many years, exactly like the uae. And more so than the uae. I'm talking about summer vacations, but also people traveling just to do their shopping in Istanbul. And Turkey was Always an extremely positive place for Israelis. And this goes to the doctrine of Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion said, we can have peace with our near neighbors, the Arab countries. Let's have peace with Iran and Turkey. The second layer in the Near East, Iran and Turkey. And then look at how we come out of this war. Now. There are three countries across the region that now come out of these wars and are perceived as more powerful. The first is Turkey, by the way, it's the only one that there is absolutely no doubt as to that. The second one is Iran sees itself as more powerful and in the Gulf they think it's more powerful. And we can argue with that. But this is the perception right now. I hope the perception will be proven wrong. And the third one is Israel. Three countries, all of them are not Arab, although the area is dominated by Arab countries. And one of them is of course an extremely small country and that's Israel. But two of them are civilizations, Turkey and Iran. And as an Israeli, if I need to make a choice in a heartbeat, I'll choose the Turks any day. Because in Turkey there is still an opposition. In Turkey, there is a tradition of cooperating with Israel. And Turkey also looks out to the west and presents a genre of Islam that is much more moderate, even if it is political, than the radical Shia faction that now controls Tehran. But this could change. And what the Israelis are saying is Turkey is a Sunni country. If it really wants to bleed again the entire region, that's a possibility. And as far as some in Israel, a danger.

A

Last question. We started this conversation about the MOU and an MOU that lasted five weeks. And now we have tankers burning in Hormuz. We have Turkey asserting its position in the region, which we've talked a lot about in this conversation. And we have a US Defense Secretary that at least for now, has canceled his trip to Israel. He may be rescheduling. It remains to be seen. So I'm going to ask you to fill in the blank in the title of this episode. Is this the start of round three with Iran or will there be an off ramp in the next couple of weeks to prevent round three? What's your actual bet?

B

My bet right now is that this is not going to devolve to a full blown war again. But it's going to get worse. It's going to get worse. I don't know if it's going to slowly get worse or exceedingly so. And I think we need to recognize something important. It's not only up to Washington, it's plausible that the Iranians themselves think that now is their time to escalate. And that's the reason we're seeing what we're seeing. And because of that, one of the worries I have is that Washington not wanting to have a war right now, not wanting the war to renew, we need to escalate too, and we will need to see what's happening in the next 48 hours. One thing is for sure, the MoU as it was negotiated, cannot stay as it is and indeed be implemented as it is into a specified agreement without some changes. The president has left open the door to negotiations, as you said at the beginning of this episode. And I think that the president doesn't want the war to renew. He wants them to agree, but he also doesn't want to negotiate with them again. As he said today. He described them as sick people. He described them as bad people. I think everybody is starting to understand what the regime in Tehran. Is.

A

Okay, Nadav, we will leave it there. Thank you as always and look forward to seeing you soon.

B

Thank you, guys.

A

Hi, it's Dan Sienor. Israel is heading into one of its most consequential elections, and this time the whole world is watching closely. Hot takes and daily noise are pretty much guaranteed to populate your media diet. But as with any election, there's a deeper story about identity, religion, democracy, and what kind of country Israelis want to live in. That's why ARC Media launched Israel Votes, a special initiative across Call me Back for heaven's sake. And Ark Newsday Daily. You'll hear from the leading candidates shaping the race, along with analysis and reporting from two of Israel's leading political analysts, ARC Media contributors Nadavael and Amit Segal. Join us for Israel Votes, your front row seat to the election that could define Israel's Future. Go to arcmedia.org votes to watch and listen. See you there.