Inside Ukraine's strategy to pressure Putin, with Dmytro Kuleba

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Hello and welcome to the Gzero World Podcast. This is where you can find extended versions of my interviews from public television. I'm Ian Bremmer. And as the Iran war heats up yet again, let's not forget another major war that continues in its brutality. The Ukraine war, Europe's largest since World War II, is now well into its fifth year. And for much of that time, Vladimir Putin has bet that Russia could simply outlast Ukraine, that Kyiv would eventually run out of soldiers, that Europe would lose its resolve, and that the United States would lose its interest. But this summer, that bet looks like it may not pay off for the Russian president. Ukraine has become increasingly adept at bringing the war deep into Russia itself, striking military and energy targets far from the front lines while keeping pressure on Crimea. At the same time, NATO has reaffirmed its support for Kyiv, with President Trump recently striking a supportive tone toward Ukraine. Now, that doesn't mean the war is nearing an end. In fact, if Putin concludes that time is no longer on his side, he might look for new, more dangerous ways to raise the stakes. Joining me today from Kyiv is Dmytro Kuleba. He was Ukraine's Foreign Minister during the first years of Russia's full scale invasion. Here's our conversation.

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A

Dmytro Kuleva, thanks for joining us again.

C

It's my pleasure, Ian.

A

So I know you're in Kyiv right now. From my perspective, the last few months have felt like a lot of momentum shifting towards the Ukrainians in this war. You've told me you're more cautious than that. Why?

C

Well, it's fair to say it's shifting, but has it shifted yet? I don't think so. Because if you look at our long dip strikes, we have changed the dynamics in the war. If you look at the front line, Russia is still advancing in one part, we are advancing in other parts, so it's more or less on par. And we are heading into another winter, which I think Putin will exploit to the maximum of his capabilities in order to break Ukraine down. So, yes, we are stronger than we were six months ago. But is this the end? I don't think so.

A

The place where the Ukrainians have had the greatest impact, at least in terms of the headlines, has been the Ability to strike, it appears with impunity deep, deep inside Russia, in Siberia, in the Arctic, in St. Petersburg, at the beginning of spif, which is Putin's own sort of Davos inside Russia, not very well attended these days. And in Moscow, what's the intention? How much of this is about wanting to just really crush their energy capabilities, which is a lot of the targeting. How much of it is need to bring this to the Russian people, show them that the Ukrainians are a far more capable adversary.

C

Let's get the record straight here. Ukraine is the first country in the world that invaded Russia since Second World War last in, in the summer of 2024 in the region, of course. And Ukraine has also become the first nation in the entire history of the world that started striking Russia in Siberia. No one ever did that before. So I think these two mere facts strike speak in favor of the conclusion that Ukraine kind of developed very special capabilities, but also has stamina to deploy them. Unlike our friends from the west who have always been very cautious about doing anything inside of Russia and only allowed hitting Russia back inside of Ukraine.

A

But the strategy that the Ukrainians have, again, I mean, goes without saying, it's very different those capabilities than what we saw a year ago, two years ago, and it's playing inside Russia. Talk to me about what the Ukrainians believe they are accomplishing and what they want to accomplish through this military capacity.

C

Since the very beginning of the full scale invasion, Ukraine, unlike its partners, was not viewing this war through the prism of the escalation ladder. It rather saw it as an area that need to be saturated with as many challenges to Russia as possible and take this pressure to the extent when Russia will not be capable of handling all of them simultaneously. We have been less successful in the past, we are more successful now. But this is the strategy. You cannot defeat Russia on the battlefield only you have to go into the rear. You have to chase Russian shadow fleet all across the globe. It's basically a strategy of scorched earth.

A

What has the most impact? Is it, I mean, from your perspective, where are the Russians potentially weakest? Is it all of the casualties they're taking which are greater than replacement rate of what the Russians can raise in their soldiers? Is it the impact on their economy and the shortages with gas? Is it the visible strikes against Moscow and Petersburg? Because again, all of these things are in service of trying to end the war? So far no success at all there. If there is going to be progress, we where do you think that progress is most likely to come from? And why?

C

On all fronts, preferably simultaneously. But I am, you know, I'm a child of the late Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was collapsing in front of my teenage eyes. And I remember vividly the scene in Moscow that I witnessed in 1991. Empty stores, empty shelves in what used to be Soviet supermarkets, Like, completely empty. And people realizing that the system collapsed, the system failed. This is what Ukraine is trying to achieve with its deep strikes. It's not only to deprive Russia of oil or gas resources and weaken its war machine. It is also to bring the war home to the Russians, to expose the weakness of the regime to them, and to basically nudge the regime towards the collapse.

A

What have you seen so far, if anything, from either the Russian people or from the Russian leadership that could show you that there is the beginning of that occurring?

C

Not yet. I mean, I could easily refer to the social media and the emergence of various viral posts coming from the Russians who complain on their authorities for not being capable to protect them and to provide them with basic services. I would not overestimate the impact of those messages on Kremlin yet, because, you know, this is a walk, a long walk, starts with the first step, but we have found the lever, and that lever is inside of Russia. It's not in the occupied territories of Ukraine.

A

No difference. I mean, with Putin suddenly ordering Lukashenko, the Belarus president, to come to Moscow to meet with him. In terms of the meetings that you've seen them having with the Chinese, the comparative isolation of Putin, I mean, it's all getting reported in Ukraine and the United States, but it's unclear that there's anything with impact. You see anything differently?

C

No, I think the Lukashenko pattern is pretty much the same as we've seen before. Every time Putin corners Lukashenk, the Belarusian leader picks up the phone and calls Beijing. This time he rushed to Beijing, probably suggesting that he was not merely cornered, but literally pressed against the wall. And it always worked before. I mean, somehow the pressure on Lukashenko is. Is relieved after every conversation he has with. With the Chinese. So I think he will stick to that pattern, because the last thing he wants is to see how Ukrainian drones and missiles land on Belarusian soil.

A

And you've heard from President Zelensky that, What is it, 40 days now that he's expecting to see particularly intense strikes against Russia, to show them what the Ukrainian capabilities are. If at the end of those 40 days, we see no movement from Putin, no movement on negotiations, nothing happening inside of Russia that would make you change your assessment, what then? Do the Ukrainians need to do well.

C

I'm pretty certain that we will be having our own, like a little Trumpian moment when the deadline is first set, then extended, and then it becomes fluid. But the comparison, the parallel ends here because what Ukraine is going to do is clear. It will ramp up and double down. The more time we have, the more drones, long range drones we will produce and the more sophisticated they will be, the more time we have, the better will be our missile capabilities. And I'm certain that our ballistic missile is on its way, literally. So our greatest weakness today is air defenses. And it's crucial actually, because I believe that the main battles of this war from now on will be fought in the air, not on the ground.

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A

President Trump in the recent NATO summit in Ankara was certainly much more engaged and friendly with your President Zelenskyy than we've seen in past meetings. I'd say the most that we've seen, the promise to provide licenses to deal with on the Patriot interceptors, which would help to address this vulnerability you're talking about. It seems that we're quite far from actually operationalizing that. Was that actually a significant change in policy from the U.S. yes, it's a

C

big change in policy. And in that sense, Trump is going much further than President Biden did. I appreciate what President Biden did for Ukraine, no doubt about that. But I was in the room when Ukraine raised the licensing issue for the first time with President Biden, and that was December 2023, and it's been what, two and a half years? So if we presume that it takes at least two years to build a factory, to put it in production, to address all the bottlenecks when it comes to the supplies, I think it's a big political breakthrough. It's a strategically important development, but it doesn't solve the problem because I think in general the solution will not be in providing Ukraine with any specific type of weapon, but in developing an ecosystem of air defenses where Patriot missiles will be playing their role. But Ukraine will also have its own anti ballistic missile. And we are recording this when Zelenskyy is meeting with Macron and some several other European leaders in Paris to discuss a joint European anti ballistic project of which Ukraine will be a Part. And, of course, we will have to offer many more local solutions for air defenses. There is not one single wonder weapon that can solve our problem. We need to address the issue in its complexity.

A

It does seem, though, that more broadly, the crisis that we saw Zelensky walk into and out of at the White House a year ago in April, when Trump said he didn't have the cards, that we seem to be in a very different environment today in the NATO summit in Ankara, where the Americans and the Europeans maybe not equally frustrated with Putin, but certainly frustrated with Putin blaming the Russians more for not ending the war than Trump had been blaming Zelensky. Do you think that's accurate? And do you see NATO policy as pretty coordinated in support of Ukraine right now?

C

I believe one problem is to make President Trump change his mind and align with European view and Ukrainian view of the war. But it's a different level of problem to make President Trump sustain his position on the matter. And Zelenskyy and other European leaders should be commended, including just NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, for spending in a year and a half, basically placating Trump, but in the end taking him to the safe port. But how to keep him there? This is the question, and I think it will be a big, big question for them, and they will be spending a lot of energy on answering it.

A

If Putin ends up in a much worse position over time and he starts to feel the need to lash out as a consequence, to escalate, do you think that the potential of that escalation is growing into actual NATO states, not just Ukraine itself? We hear a lot about this from some advisors around Putin. We certainly haven't heard Putin make those threats directly.

C

Yeah, I think it's a plausible scenario. But whether he will actually resort to it, that's another question. Because if you look at him, what kind of options does he have? What kind of cards does he have in his hands? Technological breakthrough. He can instruct his engineers to come up with new solutions to both attack Ukraine and defend Russia from Ukrainian attacks. Mobilization, more cannon fodder. And the third one is changing the tactics. Smarter generals, smarter officers on the ground, more efficient combat. The fourth one is actually attack against a NATO ally. And the fifth one is nuclear. So I think he will be playing with the first four while threatening from time to time, the fifth, and these five cards will constitute his strategy basically for the months to come, if not

A

years, before we close. I want to ask just a couple more questions about Ukraine's future. Ukraine historically wanted to join NATO. It's A red line for Putin. It's also been in reality a red line for Biden and certainly for Trump. Does it matter going forward when Ukraine actually is creating the most powerful defense in Europe, on the European continent? Does it matter when the Europeans are working to invest in Ukraine's defense, developing joint ventures, the Germans, other countries? Is NATO really all that important for Ukraine? As a consequence of the realities of defense cooperation on the ground as we

C

speak, it is less important than it was. But strategically, for all of the reasons that you mentioned, Ukraine will of course prefer to be a part of a collective security mechanism, whether it's NATO or something that will come after it. But look at what Ukraine is doing with other European nations. We co produce, we set up joint ventures. So if, if our defense industry becomes integrated, it would be foolish not to integrate the whole security architecture into one. And I sincerely believe that for many reasons, it would be in the best interest of NATO to have Ukraine on board, not only to benefit from its capabilities and its vigor, but also to kind of have a certain level of control of how Ukraine will be willing to apply its force in the region and beyond.

A

And on the EU side, since the last time you and I have spoken, Viktor Orban was dramatically and summarily defeated in his elections in Hungary. This was the biggest thorn and opposition to Ukrainian membership in the eu. You now have a leader that's much more interested. Does that process now look reasonably smooth to you? And how important is it for the Ukrainians?

C

Our relationship with the European Union was taken to the next level as a result of the creeping annexation of Ukrainian lands by Russia. That was a wake up call to

A

Europe before the 2022 invasion.

C

Yes, even before 2022, and particularly since that. Today I would describe our reality as a creeping accession of Ukraine into the European Union. There will be many obstacles because our Central European friends, I think, will do to us everything their Western European friends did to them when they were exceeding the European Union. There will be tons of problems and if not Orban, there will be someone else while we see what's happening in Poland, for example, when it comes to the demands towards Ukraine and conditioning Ukraine's accession to addressing historical issues. So tons of problems are ahead, but I think they will be resolved eventually because, you know, the project of the European Union was launched to make Europe safe and prosperous. Without security, you cannot be prosperous. And without Ukraine, Europe cannot be a safe place. It's not the will of politicians, it's the wills of history that will pull Ukraine into the eu.

A

Final question. I want to ask. You were, of course a member of cabinet and a very important one in this Zelenskyy government. You're not anymore. We've just seen a pretty big shakeup of the Ukrainian cabinet. It is, you know, a lot of pressure on Ukrainian democracy, fighting a war and developing a war economy and of course, living under martial law so that you can't have ongoing elections. Are you worried at all about the future of Ukrainian democracy and about where the next elections might go?

C

No. I mean, there will be risks of populism, of tough guys running for offices, but I know the people of Ukraine. I know our history. And we are a democracy. Not because we never had politicians who tried to turn us into autocracy or anything similar to that. We are a democracy because every time anyone tried to do that, he failed and ended up either outside of the office or in exile in Moscow. So our checks and balances are enshrined in the people of Ukraine, not even in our legal system and political system. And I'm certain that they will work when and if the moment comes.

A

Demytro Kuleba, Great to see you again.

C

Thank you.

A

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